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The European Union is the product of a 
unique institutional process: individual states, 
often with a history of belligerent relationships, 
have gradually given up ever more sovereignty 
to produce an increasing number of common 
goods, including the Single Market, a joint cur-
rency, and common policies. In the process, the 
Union has integrated increasingly diverse coun-
tries and achieved institutional progress beyond 
its borders. These achievements are particularly 
remarkable given that member states have had, 
and still have, widely different views of the 
desirable speed and ultimate depth of integra-
tion. Possibly the single most powerful force 
sustaining the process of integration has been 
the implicit, and often explicit, threat by more 
committed member states to form an inner core, 
a “club-in-the-club.” Conversely, less enthusias-
tic members have supported extending member-
ship to more countries as a strategy to frustrate 
deeper integration.
We build a simple theory to analyze how 
“deepening” and “widening” interact. Members 
have different costs in contributing to a com-
mon good, a “reform.” Decisions require una-
nimity so that the level of reform is determined 
by the highest-cost (or “weakest”) member. To 
push through more deepening, “stronger” mem-
bers can threaten to form an inner club. A two-
class Union involves costs for all members, but 
 Closely related is the literature comparing club par-
ticipation of heterogeneous agents in the presence of, e.g., 
externalities (Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco 200; 
Avinash Dixit 2003; Bard Harstad 2006; Kjell Hausken, 
Walter Mattli, and Thomas Pluemper 2006).
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benefits only the members of the inner club. 
Weaker members may, hence, spend more effort 
on reforms, in order to prevent the threat from 
being executed. We show that widening can 
have different effects on deepening. When a new 
member is stronger than the weakest incumbent 
member, deepening and widening are comple-
ments, and the effort of the Union increases. 
When the new member is weaker, though, they 
can be substitutes and the effort of the Union 
may fall.
The results above hold when the threat of 
forming a club-in-the-club remains off equilib-
rium, as has been the case in the EU until now. 
We apply our analysis to the history of the trea-
ties governing the European Union. We show 
that its key elements can be understood as out-
comes of a delicate balancing act between main-
taining the pressure to pursue further integration 
(deepening) and enlarging the Union to more 
member states (widening). We demonstrate the 
differences between the enlargement to stron-
ger countries such as Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden, and the Eastern Enlargement, which 
more than any previous enlargement increased 
heterogeneity.
We finally expand the logic of our theory in 
two directions: first, to rationalize the general 
move from unanimity voting to different types 
of majority; and second, to explore the possibil-
ity that a club-in-the-club may actually form and 
its implications for further EU reforms.
I.  A Model of Reform under Unanimity
We consider the European Union as an organ-
ization with N member states, which produce a 
common good. To develop our arguments, we 
analyse a simplified version of the model by 
Berglof et al. (2007). In particular, all members 
choose simultaneously an effort level e with-
out first agreeing by vote on how much effort 
(common good) to provide. The consumption 
benefit of each member is determined by the 
smallest effort in the organization, scaled by the 
size of the organization: N min 3e, e2, … , eN4 . 
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The Leontief production technology captures 
in a simple manner the notion that under una-
nimity some members can hold back the entire 
organization.
All members receive the same utility from 
consuming the common good, but differ in their 
cost of effort. Member state i [ N has effort cost 
ui e
2/2, and the parameter (type) ui is equidistantly 
distributed on the support 3u–, u– 4 . Assigning rank  
to the most productive or strongest type u–, the 
cost parameter of the member with rank i is
()  ui 5 u– 1 
i 2 1
N 2 1  Qu– 2 u–R .
The Leontief technology implies that member 
i’s payoff is
(2)  y 1ui, ei 2 5 N min 5e, … , eN6 2 uiei2/2.
As the members have different costs, their pre-
ferred amount of public good differs. We intention-
ally abstract from transfer payments as a means 
to influence members’ effort choices. Instead, 
we show how the threat of a club-in-the-club can 
coerce weaker members to exert more effort.
Since the efforts of the member states are 
complements, our simultaneous move game 
has a continuum of Nash equilibrium outcomes 
(Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews 993; 
Jon Vislie 994). Denoting by e~ the minimum 
effort level exerted by all members except i, 
member i chooses effort to maximize
(3)  N min 5e~, ei6 2 uiei2/2.
Thus, member i’s optimal choice is ei 5 N/ui 
if e~ $ N/ui, and ei 5 e~ otherwise, since any 
effort ei 2 e~ . 0 would be wasted. Whenever 
the constraint N/ui , e~ binds for some type i 
5 k, it also binds for all less productive types 
i 5 k 1 , … , N. Consequently, the effort level 
N / u– at which the payoff of the weakest type u– 
reaches its unconstrained optimum determines 
the maximum effort level that can be sustained 
in equilibrium. In addition, any effort level e 5 30, N / u–2 can also be supported as a Nash equi-
librium because no individual member has a 
unilateral incentive to change the effort level. 
We will use the Pareto-dominant equilibrium 
with e 5 N / u– as a benchmark to assess the 
effectiveness of the threat of a club-in-the-club 
as a reform mechanism.
PROPOSITION : Under unanimity, the weak-
est member of the organization can impose its 
privately optimal choice e 5 N / u–, thereby hold-
ing back the entire organization.
There is in principle no reason why unanim-
ity should favor weaker rather than stronger 
members. We have chosen our setting to cap-
ture the common view that the unanimity rule 
protects particularly weak members and slows 
down reforms.
We now introduce the possibility of an inner 
organization by allowing a subset of members 
n , N to exert more effort. The n members of the 
inner organization remain members of the initial, 
henceforth “outer,” organization. For simplicity, 
we permit at most one inner organization that 
must have at least two members 1n $ 2). The lat-
ter is a natural restriction, as the purpose of the 
inner organization is to provide a common good. 
In addition, an inner organization with n mem-
bers imposes a negative externality on the outer 
organization: for all N members of the outer 
organization it reduces the utility of consuming 
the outer public good by ln, where l $ 0. We 
can think of this as, e.g., trade diversion follow-
ing the introduction of the common currency.
Each member of the inner organization enjoys 
additional benefits of n 3eIn 2 eOut 4 , where eIn 1eOut 2 denotes the minimal effort exerted by any 
member of the inner (outer) organization. The 
payoff of type i [ n, who is a member of both 
the inner and the outer organization, is
(4)  yi 5 n 3eIn 2 eOut 4 1 NeOut 2 ln 2 uiei2/2.
The payoff of type j, who is a member of only 
the outer organization, is
(5)  yj 5 NeOut 2 ln 2 uj ej
2/2.
A club-in-the-club emerges if at least two mem-
bers exert more effort than all other members. 
The outer effort level is the lowest effort level 
chosen by any member and, in equilibrium, is 
never below the privately optimal level of the 
least productive type. The effort level of the 
inner club is determined by the second-low-
est effort level. However, our objective here is 
to show how the threat of a club-in-the-club 
makes “deepening” possible in the sense that 
the organization-wide effort increases. That is, 
we are interested in the highest effort level that 
VOL. 98 NO. 2 135WIDENING AND DEEPENING: REfORMING thE EUROPEAN UNION
is compatible with an outcome in which no inner 
organization forms.
Given that an inner club needs at least two 
members, no member has an incentive to exert 
more effort than all other members. By contrast, 
if a single member exerts less effort, the addi-
tional effort of all other N 2  members is not 
wasted anymore. Instead, they form an inner 
organization, thereby reducing their utility from 
the outer public good by l 1N 2 2 . Thus, when 
choosing effort, each member compares the 
payoff from matching the common effort level 
(which involves higher disutility from effort 
and higher consumption) with the payoff from 
working less but incurring the deadweight loss 
l 1N 2 2 . Applying this trade-off to the weakest 
type yields the maximum effort level eCN 5 N / u
– 
1 "2l 1N 2 1 2 /u , which is compatible with all 
members choosing the same effort. Henceforth, 
we refer to this level as the coercion effort level.
PROPOSITION 2: the threat of an inner orga-
nization can coerce weaker members to exert 
more effort, thereby increasing the organi-
zation’s maximum effort level to eCN 5 N / u
– 
1 "2l 1N 2 1 2 /u .
The possibility of an inner organization can 
make reform feasible; weaker members exert 
more effort in order to avoid the execution of the 
threat. Hence, unanimity need not confine an 
organization to the pace preferred by its weak-
est member.
We now consider the effect of “widening,” 
i.e., a new member joining the club. Our interest 
concerns the relationship between the widening 
of the Union and its deepening, which amounts 
in our model to the impact that the new member 
has on the coercion effort level.
Suppose, first, that the newly admitted mem-
ber unew is more productive than the organiza-
tion’s least productive type u–. In this case, the 
coercion effort level unambiguously increases: 
the higher consumption benefits of an enlarged 
club provide the weakest type with stronger 
incentives to exert effort. In addition, exert-
ing less effort than all other N members of the 
enlarged club entails a larger externality lN. 
Consequently, the threat of an inner organiza-
tion becomes more effective, thereby eliciting 
even more effort from the least productive type.
When the new member is less productive 
than the (previously) weakest type u–, the new 
type unew is decisive for the coercion effort level. 
Parallel to the reasoning of Proposition 2, the 
coercion effort level in the enlarged club with N 
1  members is eCN1 1unew2 5 1N 1 2 / u–new 1 !2lN/unew.
PROPOSITION 3: Deepening and widening are 
complements, that is, eCN1 1unew2 $ eCN 1u–2, if and 
only if the new member is sufficiently advanced, 
unew , u
~
, where u– 1N 1 2/N , u~ , u–N/ 1N 2 2.
PROOF:
The coercion effort level eCN1 1unew2 mono-
tonically decreases in unew . By direct substitu-
tion, one can show that eCN1 1u– 1N 1 2/N2 . 
eCN 1u–2 and eCN1 1u–N/ 1N 2 2 2 , eCN 1u–2 , which 
proves the proposition.
When the new member has high effort cost 
unew . u
– 1N 1 2/N, there are two opposing 
effects. As above, a larger club makes the threat 
of an inner organization stronger, increasing 
the coercion effort level. However, the privately 
optimal effort choice of the new member e 5 1N 1 2/unew is lower than that of the previously 
least productive type u–. This, in turn, implies 
that the new weakest type is also more reluc-
tant to exert high effort. Intuitively, this latter 
effect is dominated by the effect of a stronger 
club-in-the-club threat if the new type is not too 
unproductive, i.e., unew [ 3u– 1N 1 2/N, u~4 . That 
is, even though such a type is weaker than all 
current members, it would, if admitted, contrib-
ute to the deepening of the organization in the 
sense of increasing the coercion effort level. For 
all weaker types unew . u
~
, the increase in the 
threat of an inner organization does not suffice 
to compensate the higher effort cost, and widen-
ing reduces the scope for deepening. Finally, the 
two effects go in the same direction when the 
previously weakest type u– is only slightly stron-
ger than the new type unew [ 3 u–, u– 1N 1 2/N4 . 
Accordingly, widening increases both the pri-
vately optimal effort choice of the weakest type 
and the coercion effort, as in the case when the 
new member is more productive than type u–.
II.  The Evolution of the European Union and the 
Threat of an Inner Club
In the Treaty of Rome 1957 the Benelux coun-
tries, France, Germany, and Italy created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) through 
which they committed themselves to promoting 
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trade and exchange in an “ever closer Union.” 
They also called upon the other peoples of Europe 
sharing their ideals to join, opening hereby for 
new members, provided they would satisfy cer-
tain criteria. To reassure national electorates, most 
important decisions would be taken by unanimity 
in the Council, the main decision-making body 
representing all national governments. The Union 
has subsequently been enlarged in five rounds, 
and the Treaty of Rome was revised many times.
The  Maastricht  Treaty  1993  and the subse-
quent formation of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU)  is  probably the most fitting illustration 
of our model. The successive accessions of the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain, completed in 986, had sig-
nificantly increased the Union’s heterogeneity 
in terms of the desire for deeper integration and 
costs of reform. During the second half of the 
980s, EC Commission President Jacques Delors 
and the stronger members had pushed for further 
integration, often under a thinly veiled threat to 
form an inner core. The Treaty of Maastricht 
made this threat explicit with the creation of the 
European Monetary Union. The treaty specified 
strict criteria for joining this club-in-the-club, 
requiring reform efforts particularly painful for 
countries with large budgetary problems, such as 
Greece and Italy. The formation of a monetary 
union and the creation of a joint currency had 
many benefits that would accrue only to partici-
pating members; the deadweight loss from trade 
diversion would, however, be carried by all club 
members. Few observers anticipated at the time 
that all countries eventually would be able to meet 
the criteria. The EMU process led to a revitali-
zation of the European integration process and a 
phase of growth.
The Treaty of Amsterdam 1999: Eastern En-
largement was more or less certain to happen, and 
some member states were threatening to proceed 
beyond macroeconomic coordination,2 when 
European leaders incorporated “closer coopera-
tion” in individual policy areas as an institution of 
the EU. A subset of member states, at least eight, 
could proceed with deeper integration, provided 
the European Council authorized such closer 
2  For example, French President Jacques Chirac and 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer both explicitly 
proposed that a subset of EU members should pursue inte-
gration further.
cooperation with qualified majority.3 Further-
more, the Amsterdam Treaty extended qualified 
majority voting to a few additional areas.
The Reform Treaty 2007, yet to be ratified by 
member states, is the result of a drawn-out process 
to address the institutional challenges posed by the 
Eastern Enlargement. The treaty incorporates most 
of the revisions from the Nice Treaty of 2003 and 
important elements of the rejected Constitution. 
Under the new rules for “enhanced cooperation” 
in the Reform Treaty (“closer cooperation” in the 
Amsterdam Treaty), the requirement of a mini-
mum of eight members remains, but after enlarge-
ment this represents less than a third, rather than 
more than half, of member states. The Reform 
Treaty follows the Nice Treaty in assigning more 
firmly the responsibility to coordinate enhanced 
cooperation to the European Commission.4
The Reform Treaty extends qualified majority 
voting to 20 new policy areas, such as energy pol-
icy and humanitarian aid, leaving only key areas 
to be decided unanimously (including tax, social 
policy, defence, foreign policy, and treaty revi-
sions). The Reform Treaty also redefines quali-
fied majority voting into double majority voting, 
requiring a minimum of 55 per cent of Member 
States representing a minimum of 65 per cent of 
the EU’s population to pass legislation. Thus, the 
European Union responded to increasing hetero-
geneity by weakening the veto rights of individual 
Member States and, more recently, by lowering 
the bar for passage in the European Council. The 
hope is that these changes will help maintaining 
the reform pressure.
III.  Majority Voting and the  
“Club-in-the-Club” Threat
Our theory argues that the threat of forming a 
club-in-the-club can be a powerful instrument to 
make weak members work harder for common 
goals. To date, the EU has remained a club of 
states with equal membership rights; the threat has 
not yet been executed. Rather, the Union increas-
ingly uses, or intends to use, qualified majority 
voting, an instrument offering a substitute mecha-
nism for making less committed member states 
increase their efforts. Where a qualified majority 
3  In other words, both a majority of member states and 
qualified majority of votes were necessary.  
4  Part III, Title VI, Chapter III, Article III-322-329 in 
the Reform Treaty.
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governs a policy area, the EU-wide contributions 
for public goods are higher than the ones the 
weakest member would force upon the others by 
using their veto power. Qualified majority voting 
thus takes away power from individual member 
states. Consistent with our theory, the policy areas 
in which enhanced cooperation is allowed largely 
overlap with those where qualified majority vot-
ing applies, suggesting that, indeed, they are 
substitutes.
In the simple model brought forward in this 
paper, a move from veto to majority voting can 
be conceptualized as follows. When an entrant 
is weaker than the weakest of the incumbent 
member states, the weakest incumbent may pre-
fer qualified majority (in the extreme, unanimity 
minus one) to unanimity, because otherwise effort 
falls too much. The club would thus prepare itself 
for the accession of weaker countries by changing 
the voting rights.
In a more general setting (Berglof et al. 2007), 
we show that when the heterogeneity among mem-
bers of a club increases, the threat of a club-in-
the-club may be executed. This provides a strong 
rationale to engage in the costly process of trans-
forming the voting rights to a qualified majority. 
When members of a club ex ante do not know pre-
cisely what their relative position with respect to 
some policy areas will be, they may indeed agree 
to give up their right to veto ex ante to avoid the 
formation of an inner club ex post.
This leads us to the crucial question of whether 
the threat of forming a club-in-the-club will ulti-
mately be executed, and what the consequences 
would be. Notice that a member state not ratify-
ing the Reform Treaty (and, before that, the failed 
Constitution) faces the prospect of not partici-
pating in the integration process laid out in the 
document. Presumably it would instead have to 
join some looser, yet to be defined, organization, 
possibly akin to the European Economic Area. 
EEA member states are essentially subject to the 
same rules as EU members, but without the right 
to participate in the process through which these 
rules are adopted. Such exclusion could be very 
costly, particularly if a country found itself alone. 
However, there would also be costs for the Union 
from having an important country, say the United 
Kingdom, excluded in this way.
There is yet another consequence of a club-
in-the-club actually materializing. Consider the 
EMU, potentially a first inner club for countries 
wanting not only monetary integration, but also 
integration of financial regulation and supervi-
sion. Nonmembers have been keen to ensure that 
the option of EMU as an inner club is not pur-
sued. In particular, for new EU members who 
seem unlikely to meet the Maastricht criteria in 
the near future, the EMU increasingly appears as 
a club-in-the-club potentially diverting trade and 
investments from them. As a result such a club-in-
the-club would also decrease the value of acceding 
to the Union. Berglof and Gérard Roland (997) 
have argued that membership in the EU provided 
applicant transition countries with a powerful out-
side “anchor” when bringing about institutional 
changes. Mike Burkart and Klaus Wallner (2000) 
have provided a formal theory of this effect, still 
clearly visible particularly in the countries of 
Southeastern Europe. Such a weakening of the 
“soft powers” of the Union from a club-in-the-club 
actually forming is an additional risk that needs to 
be considered when revising the treaties.
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